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The subjects oforganized crime and economics seem two very different topics for 
research. This paper is an attempt to reconcile the two in order to examine organized 
crime in the framework ofeconomic analysis. In specific, it deals with the organized 
criminal activities during the period ofprohibition. 
The central task ofthe paper is to determine whether or not organized criminals 
used economic patterns in establishing the very lucrative trade in illicit liquor during the 
period. In order to achieve the fullest understanding ofthis, the paper also includes 
discussions ofthe history ofprohibition in America, a summary ofthe economy ofthe 
period, and a brief history oforganized crime. However, the true body ofthe work is 
found in the section.8*, which is the analysis ofcriminal activity using economics. 
The analysis shows a clear linkage between the business patterns prevalent at the 
time and those activities undertaken by organized criminals. Consolidation and 
monopolization are the most common similarity. However, tools such as the dominant 
firm model are also utilized successfully. Specialization is a major topic ofdiscussion, and 
a major tool used by organized crime. 
The hypothesis that organized criminals during prohibition used economic 
reasoning to plan their activities is clearly supported. The differences between the 
organized criminals and legitimate businessmen ofthe day seem to be the former's 
penchant for violence and willingness to repeatedly break the law. 
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Economics and organized crime seem, at least on the surface, to be two subjects which 
have few common themes. How, then, can organized crime be analyzed using an economic 
framework? This paper is an attempt to answer that question. Very little has been written on the 
subject of organized crime which involves economic analysis. The vast majority of the work 
centers around a style which can be considered popular history. Driven by the legends and the 
folklore which are prevalent in American society, organized crime and its notorious faces have 
become very famous. Work of a more theoretical nature is also in existence, attempting to define 
and explain the phenomenon that has become American organized crime. Frederic Homer's 
Guns and Garlic is one very good example of this. 
However, research confined to organized crime in the period of prohibition yields little of 
value. The historical works on the period vary. Those written almost immediately after 
prohibition are complimentary of the experiment and virtually ignore the ramifications and 
existence of organized crime. Later works highlight such activities at the risk of overemphasis. 
None of them specifically deal with organized crime during prohibition in an economic context. 
Perhaps Humbert Nelli's The Big Business ojOrganized Crime comes closest, emphasizing the 
entrepreneurial tendencies and motives of gangsters. The shortcoming in Nelli's work, however, 
is that he specifically limits his research to Italian organized crime. By doing so, he has 
eliminated many of the noteworthy players of the period and presented a somewhat disjointed 
chronology. The best work on the subject of organized crime during prohibition is Herbert 
Asbury's The Great Illusion. This book provides a chronological look at prohibition and the 
temperance movement. However, there is little specific reference to the economic aspects of 
these events. 
Did the activities of organized criminals during prohibition mirror established economic 
patterns? Did they involve economic innovations? The attempt to answer these questions is the 
basis of this work. To that end, a series of other questions must first be answered. Firstly, one 
must discern how and why prohibition was adopted and why the adoption occurred in the 1920s. 
Secondly, the impact of prohibition, especially on the economy, must be understood. However, 
to adequately analyze the affect on the economy, the economic context must be decided. At this 
point it becomes necessary to examine the nature of organized crime. The links to other 
countries and other time periods must be made. The differences between these manifestations of 
organized crime and those which occurred during prohibition are essential as a starting point for 
deeper analysis. 
The focus of the paper is organized criminal activity which occurred between January of 
1920 and 1932. For practical reasons, the analysis will be limited to activities in New York and 
Chicago, both of which were major crime centers of the era. This activity will be presented 
chronologically. The famous faces and events of the era will also be a focus. 
The paper will then move to the central question. The basic economic functions of 
criminal organization, as theorized by Frederic Homer, will be presented examined with 
narrowed focus on the period ofprohibition. I will argue that criminal organization mirrored 
other economic organization of the period. 
Based on this analysis of organized crime and available statistics, prohibition will be 
critiqued, in an attempt to highlight possible reasons for the rather obvious failure of the legal 
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experiment. An examination of the enforcement practices of the federal and state governments 
will be the focus of this section. Also central to this section of the paper is the question of 
whether or not prohibition was responsible for the growth in organized crime which occurred. It 
is possible that there are other factors which caused organized crime to expand during the period, 
despite the fact that most scholars point to prohibition. 
The basic hypothesis of the work is that criminal organizations act with a definite plan, 
much the same as business. The motivations of the organization are to create and maximize 
profits. Being unlimited by legal considerations, such tactics often look very different from those 
utilized in the business world. However, several of the tactics used by organized crime are direct 
parallels to strategies which benefit legitimate corporations. During prohibition, profits were 
available at levels sufficient to induce a rapid modification and expansion of such strategies. 
Thus, prohibition was a prerequisite for the explosion of business oriented organized crime. 
The Drying of America 
Before understanding what prohibition was and how it affected America, it is necessary to 
understand how it came about. There were numerous roots and causes for the temperance 
movement in America. Throughout the years the public image of alcohol and drinking changed 
dramatically. The progression from the early stages of the United States' temperance efforts to 




Early America was far from dry. Everyone drank alcohol in some form, regardless of age 
or sex. Puritans, staunch believers in self-control, were the first of America's distillers (Asbury 
8). Alcohol was considered "God's gift to mankind and a panacea for almost every type of 
ailment" (Behr 7). Alcoholic drinks were an essential part of cultural life. Any houseguest was 
immediately given a drink and considered rude if he refused to drink it. It was not uncommon to 
receive part of one's wages in kind, with goods or services being substituted for money. Often 
these payments included alcohol (Asbury 8). In many of the colonies it was used as a form of 
currency, easing this arrangement. Employers and employees had a kind of "unwritten 
agreement" that certain days were allowed off so that one could drink heavily without suffering 
consequences (Behr 9). 
Americans loved their drink and the profits it brought so much that in 1794 many of them 
rose in rebellion when the newly formed federal government attempted to tax this substance. 
Farmers on the western edge of the frontier had found that it was far more profitable to convert 
their unused grain into whiskey. Often this was their only opportunity to gain cash. Without 
whiskey there would be no influx of money to them. It was also easier to ship across the rugged 
terrain than bulk grain and the demand was high. When the government attempted to take a 
piece of this profit, settlers began what has come to be known as the Whiskey Rebellion. Though 
the uprising was successfully squashed by the new American forces, it remains indicative of the 
attitudes about alcohol which were prevalent at the time. 
The clergy were certainly no exception to the rule of free flowing drink. Clergymen 
drank along with their congregations. Some even ran their own distilleries. There were those in 
the clergy, however, who realized the social and moral problenls created by alcohol. Perhaps the 
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first to decry the amount of drinking in the new world was Increase Mather, who prophesied in 
1673 that "the flood of excessive drinking will drown Christianity" (Behr 13). There came 
increased pressure for drinking to be limited in the early 1800s. During this time Justin Edwards 
became the first to address drinking as a moral sin (Behr 21). Around that same time John 
Asbury, a member of the Methodist clergy, began to urge his colleagues to abstain from alcohoL 
His reasons were moral and proved to be the starting point for the temperance movement that 
would follow. 
The temperance movement did not only follow a nloral track, however. From the time of 
the Continental Congress there were those, most notable among them American Revolution hero 
Dr. Benjamin Rush, who began to examine the scientific outcomes of alcohol consumption. The 
Continental Congress attempted on February 27,1777 to ban the manufacture of whiskey in the 
new country (Behr 14). Though they failed, many of the arguments they considered would 
remain in debate for years. Dr. Rush believed that liquor's curative powers had been overstated. 
He devised a chart which listed the vices and illnesses caused by alcohoL These ranged from 
idleness to murder and sickness to madness (Behr 16). Though some of the predictions seem 
illogical today, they were very persuasive to Rush's contemporaries. 
The process ofbuilding a singular temperance movement was one which involved many 
cycles. Throughout the 1800s, organizations sprang up across the country which encouraged 
temperance. After several years of prominence most fell into disfavor. Many of these 
organizations were religious in nature, following Asbury's example. Still others, such as the 
Washingtonians, formed in Baltimore in 1840, gained membership from reformed drinkers. 
Each had the common theme that drinking was a moral danger and most certainly deleterious to 
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society as a whole. 
Perhaps most vocal among these groups were those which were comprised of women. 
Alcohol was the first topic which united women into what could be called a "women's 
movement" and the first issue which was tackled using non violent protest (Behr 35). Though 
the movement was waged by women, its inspiration was a man, Dr. Dioclesian Lewis. Dr. Lewis 
was a homeopathic doctor from Harvard who also worked as a preacher, reformer, and feminist. 
He worked on several different issues before turning his attention to alcohol temperance, 
including the removal of tight corsets and long skirts from the standard costume of the American 
woman (Behr 36). During the 1860s he began the practice ofpraying for those who ran saloons. 
This activity was spread to women with the conversion of Elizabeth Thompson to the temperance 
movement. Mrs. Thompson, a middle class woman, followed Lewis' example and began to 
organize "visitation bands" to convince saloon keepers to give up their profession (Behr 36). 
The movement quickly moved to more established venues. In 1874 the Presbyterian church 
organized the National Women's Christian Temperance Union which the following year would 
petition Congress for national prohibition. Perhaps the first victory for the group, however, was 
the incorporation of anti-alcohol education in mainstream schools. Such instruction was 
dramatic, even ifit had little other value. 
Teacher would place part of a calfs brain in an empty glass jar. After discoursing 
on the nature of the brain and the nature of alcohol, she would then pour a bottle 
of alcohol into the jar. The color of the calfs brain would turn from its normal 
pink to a nasty gray. And that, the teacher would conclude in sepulchral tones, is 
what would happen to her pupils' brains if ever they drank Satan's brew. (Behr 40) 
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Though this was, for obvious reasons, probably effective, its scientific merits are somewhat 
dubious. Another branch of the women's temperance movement, perhaps the one for which it is 
best known, was the one-woman show of Carry Nation. A violent prohibitionist, Nation traveled 
around the country using her hatchet to destroy saloons, an act which soon became known as 
"hatchetizing" (Behr 40). Though she fell into obscurity later in her life, Carry Nation remains 
the best known of all the female temperance crusaders. 
Most temperance organizations pushed for local or state actions to curb the influence of 
saloon owners and distillers. Virtually all stopped short of calling for national legislation, 
however. Perhaps because of their grounding in religion, the temperance leaders preferred moral 
suasion over legal mandate. 
In 1862, however, the Federal government adopted the Internal Revenue Act. This tax on 
liquor to support the Union war effort was significant for temperance leaders. It allowed future 
arguments against national prohibition to include reasoning that such legislation would cost the 
federal government money (Asbury 63). It also sent those temperance leaders who had begun to 
lean in the direction of national legislation into fits. Their sentiment was expressed clearly by 
Kansas Senator Samuel C. Pomeroy when he decried the Act as a "national licensing law" and 
called instead for national prohibition, the first such public call (Asbury 63). In fact, the tax did 
prove to be lucrative for the federal government, comprising almost one fourth of revenue, 
according to Dr. D. Leigh Colvin, a prominent twentieth century prohibition supporter, in years 
right after the law's passage (Asbury 63). 
The drys of the early 1900s not only faced a battle from a government reluctant to forego 
revenue, but from an economically powerful business, as welL Saloon operators, restaurant 
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owners, distillers and brewers all had highly vested interests in preventing prohibition. To ensure 
that these interests were protected the brewers formed the United States Brewers' Association. 
Each faction lobbied heavily for continuing the status quo. Understanding that a large number of 
the drinkers in America were immigrants, they courted many of these peoples and attempted to 
gain their favor. Also aware of the huge importance of the women's temperance tendencies, such 
organizations actively rallied against women's suffrage, attempting to minimize their impact 
(Behr 47). Each presented evidence that prohibition would cost them dearly and harm the 
economy by destroying their capital investments. These investments were substantial. In 1914, 
the Brewer's Yearbook estimated that the capital investment in liquor was around 
$1,294,583,426 (Asbury 111). United States Census Bureau numbers from that year, while 
lower, seem to support the claim of huge losses of investment. The Census Bureau estimated 
capital investment at $915,715,000 (Asbury 111). Temperance supporters were thus forced to 
acknowledge the huge costs ofprohibition. 
However, the Anti-Saloon League, a non-religious organization formed in 1893, insisted 
that the cost to society of continued alcohol consumption far outweighed that which would be 
borne by those involved in the industry. There was, at the time, a prevalent saloon society. Prior 
to Prohibition there was one saloon for every three hundred citizens (Behr 49). A later study in 
Chicago at the beginning ofProhibition found there were 7094 saloons and that of these 445 
"contributed to the delinquency of 14,000 girls every 24 hours" (Asbury 115). This study 
confirmed the public fears that alcohol contributed to other problems such as prostitution and to 
the lowering morals of the working class as a whole. The actions of the Anti-Saloon League 
would eventually bring national prohibition into reality. 
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It was the ASL's behind the scenes leader, Wayne Wheeler, who was most responsible 
for this success. The graduate of Oberlin was discovered at his alma mater where he acted as a 
preacher and organizer of temperance activities. In his early days Wheeler was known for his 
tireless efforts to persuade the hearts of Ohioans. Door to door on his bicycle, he lobbied for the 
Haskell bill, which allowed a county to become dry with a simple majority vote (Behr 55). In 
1898 he became the attorney for the ASL and nl0ved temperance forward a great deal by making 
organizational appointments without regard to party affiliation. Uncovering the tactics and ideas 
of his opponents was also very important to Wheeler and a large reason for his success. By the 
middle of the decade, Wheeler realized that drys controlled six of Southern state legislatures and 
began to move from the local or county initiative to state wide laws against alcohol (Asbury 
121). Because of Wheeler's narrow emphasis on the temperance issue he was very successful in 
having more and more drys elected into Congress. 
F or the ASL the year 1913 was very pivotal. It was in this year that Congress outlawed 
the shipment of mail order alcohol into states which were dry. The Webb-Kenyon law was 
passed over the veto of President Taft on February 28 (Asbury 124). Following that victory, the 
ASL hinted they might try for national prohibition in order to gage public response. In a New 
York Times article thirteen years later, Wheeler said of this response, "The overwhelming urge 
was for national prohibition. The canvass of public sentiment was astounding in its approval of 
the idea" (Asbury 125). The election of 1914 proved to be the opening temperance workers 
needed. Prior to the election, workers of the ASL were mobilized like never before by their 
leader. They succeeded in picking up several seats and later that session attempted to pass their 
prohibition bill. Though they failed, they were heartened by the result of a simple majority. 
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With the convening of the special session of Congress in March of 1917 to decide on 
America's entry into World War I, the drys knew they had the chance to make their move. They 
seized on the new sense of patriotism and anti-German feeling to demonize beer and alcohol 
drinkers. Playing on the worst of emotions, the drys attempted to paint beer, and by association 
all alcohol, as a German vice. To allow alcohol to remain legal was to allow the Kaiser into 
America. The Germans who were subject to such prejudice and speculation have been called 
"Prohibition's first victims" (Behr 63). Pointing to cities with large German populations such as 
Cincinnati, where beer consumption was four times the national average, drys cried out for 
protection of "American" ideals and customs (Behr 65). The campaign provided just enough 
advantage. 
With some skillful maneuvering by Wheeler, the final version of the Eighteenth 
Amendment was passed in the House on December 18, 1917 (Asbury 132). Following this 
passage, the amendment was sent to the states for ratification. Though some feared that it would 
fail because the time to ratify had been limited to six years, it passed - in just over a year (Asbury 
132). In May of 1919, over President Wilson's veto, the Eighteenth Amendment was passed by 
both the House and the Senate. 
The Eighteenth Amendment mandated that "no person shall manufacture, sell, barter, 
transport, import, export, deliver, furnish or possess any intoxicating liquor except as authorized 
in this act" (Behr 78). Over the protests of the liquor industry, many immigrant groups, and 
several concerned about personal liberty , Prohibition had come to pass. Though William 
Howard Taft warned the measure was "against the views and practices of a majority ofpeople in 
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However, the major Prohibition battles were yet to be waged. 
The Backdrop 
Prohibition was not placed into a vacuum. As with any other law, it was passed and then 
enforced with human beings, all of whom had their own opinions. In addition, the world around 
prohibition was a dynamic and quickly shifting place. Society was changing in response to the 
changing events it was forced to face. The economy of the world and the United States also 
experienced rapid change in the twelve years ofprohibition. Governnlental actions and attitudes 
toward the economy were a shaping force. The ebb and flow of expansion and recession were 
experienced several times during the period. Obviously, such events had an affect on the 
attitudes of Americans. To understand their responses to prohibition it is necessary to understand 
the events which helped to shape them. 
Prohibition began just after the close of the American involvement in World War I when 
the Volstead Act took effect. However, in order to fully understand the economic forces at work 
during the decade that was to follow, it is necessary to understand the nature and scope of the 
economy just prior to this period, as well. With the European war in 1914 the economy of 
America was seriously changed. Though Americans were not themselves directly involved in the 
war in 1914, they provided supplies to those countries which were. This lead to a net gain in 
exports between 1914 and 1917 that has been estimated at between $4.5 billion and $5 billion 
(Soule 47). The influx of money into the United States to pay for exports led to higher domestic 
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consumption and investment. 
With American involvement in 1917 came several dramatic changes in the economy. 
Firstly, there was a shift in labor supply away from the private sector with the onset of 
conscription. It is estimated that the war decreased the labor force by almost sixteen percent 
(Soule 38). Secondly, the federal government drastically increased its spending for wartime 
supplies. For example, on food and housing alone, it is estimated that the federal government 
expenditures were almost $6.25 billion (Soule 37). This spending was largely financed through 
increased taxes. The exemption for married couples was cut fronl $4,000 to $2,000 in 1917 and 
the taxation rate was doubled from two percent to four percent (Soule 48). Nevertheless, the 
government operated with a large deficit throughout the United States' involvement in the war. 
A third very important change in the economy brought about by the catalyst of war was 
the increased government organization. This was largely an innovation brought about by 
necessity. It was critically important that the armed forces be able to receive the supplies they 
needed without delay. To this end, the purchase of goods for all the branches of the military was 
consolidated and the transportation of such goods was improved through agencies such as the 
Railroad Commission. Ofvital importance to these economic preparations for war was the 
existence of the Federal Reserve. This agency allowed the government to exercise some control 
over the econonlic impact ofwar, and also facilitated the sale of bonds to finance the war. A 
major side effect of this was produced by the 1916 amendment to the Federal Reserve Act, which 
allowed expansion and rediscounting on the collateral of government bonds (Soule 52). Such 
practices allowed for the increased expansion of credit to businesses that desperately needed the 
funds for investment in order to meet wartime demands. Lending institutions took full 
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opportunity in using this tool, causing the reserve ratio of Federal Reserve banks to fall from 80 
percent to 50 percent from April of 1917 to November of 1918 (Soule 52). 
Largely because of this expansion of business credit, most industries were able to 
facilitate the expansion in demand caused by the war. Agriculture, however, was not. Planning 
time for increased production in agriculture is substantial and was lacking during this period. 
Nevertheless, the largest portion of the economy benefited tremendously from the war. 
Consequently, the gross national product, as expressed in percentage above 1914 figures, was 
fourteen percent higher in 1916 and twenty percent higher in 1917, but fell back to fifteen percent 
higher in 1918 (Soule 55). In addition to this increased growth rate, the economy of the United 
States retained several innovations made during the war. In production, interchangeable parts, 
standardized systems, and scientific management made a lasting impact (Soule 59). There was 
also a large increase in manufacturing capital in the overall economy which would facilitate later 
economic activities (Soule 60). Lastly, the automobile industry experienced significant growth 
during this period, as did complimentary industries such as oil and petroleum (Soule 60). 
During the United States' involvement in World War I, there were also several advances 
made on the behalf of workers. Many of these changes were due to the labor shortage 
experienced at the time, which was not only a product of conscription, but of lower immigration, 
as well. Because there were fewer workers to fill positions, companies rushed to compete with 
one another for labor. This competition led to increased wages and shorter hours. It was during 
this period that the work week became standardized at forty-four hours, with a half day of work 
on Saturday (Soule 73). The labor shortage was certainly instrumental in this change. However, 
another wartime phenomenon was also critical - the government contract. Federal government 
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contracts gave the government power to request concessions by their contract holders which 
would otherwise have seemed absurd ( Soule 73). Because such contracts were highly profitable, 
these concessions were usually made. 
Higher wages, however, did not always translate into a higher quality of life. There were 
shortages in many consumer goods including sugar, meat, and coal (Soule 76). There was also a 
severe shortage of affordable housing (Soule 76). In addition, those workers who were salaried 
had no access to collective bargaining arrangements and, therefore, saw little rise in their own 
inconles. Government workers who were salaried, for instance, saw their purchasing power fall 
thirty-two percent by 1918 ( Soule 76). Conversely, most farmers saw a substantial increase in 
their real income. Though many were unable to adjust their production to meet all the increase in 
demand, they benefited from rising prices, regardless. Agricultural prices rose considerably 
being (expressed as a percentage above 1913 prices) 82 percent higher in 191 7 and 106 percent 
higher in 1918 (Soule 77). However, much of this increase in real income would later be lost to 
land speculation or over-expansion. 
With the close of World War I, the United States' economy faced a serious problem. 
Almost four million men were dismissed from the military and about nine million people were 
left jobless by the war industries' closure (Soule 80). Government programs, involving both 
economic control and nlilitary contracts were ceased almost imnlediately, leaving a huge void. 
However, despite production declines in late 1918, the economy seemed to recover remarkably, 
beginning in the second quarter of 1919 and continuing through 1920. The reasons for this are 
numerous. The production of ships intended for military use was continued, with the vessels 
being used in private industry. Unemployment was curbed by the three to four million people 
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who did not continue to seek employment following the war, a large percentage of whom were 
women and others who had previously not been employed (Soule 84). Plants and manufacturing 
capital which had been built with war industries in mind were easily converted into peacetime 
endeavors. Aided by the pre-existing shortage in housing, excess labor and removal of barriers, 
the construction industry began to boom. Governmental loans to Allies for the reconstruction 
and aid of their countries provided ready cash, most of which would be spent in the United 
States. The federal government financed its own deficit by selling Victory bonds, which could be 
discounted and used as a source of loanable funds to private investors. 
Expansion ofprivate credit was a characteristic of this post-war expansion. Largely 
because of Allied purchases, facilitated by government loans, domestic businesses were provided 
with both a means and an incentive for expansion. Feeling they could easily profit of the sale of 
goods as prices continued to rise, they rapidly expanded their inventories. The expansion was so 
substantial that the Federal Reserve, in June of 1919, encouraged member banks to curtail the 
expansion of speculative credit in an attempt to stop prices from climbing. However, businesses 
continued to receive credit and expand their inventory, further speculating that prices wold 
continue to rise. The result of this inventory speculation was an erratic movement in price 
relationships, especially those of raw materials. 
In 1921, this post-war expansion came to an abrupt end with one of the most severe price 
crashes in American history. According to George Soule, the economy was forced to absorb, in 
less than one year, a reduction in purchasing power that was equal to one fourth of the national 
income (Soule 97). This was the result of both governmental policies and private sector 
expansion activities. The government began to pursue a balanced budget, which necessarily 
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meant higher taxes. Taxes were once again doubled, from four percent to eight percent (Soule 
97). Banks had exhausted all their credit abilities and were running dangerously close to legal 
reserve requirements. Because much of the credit previously extended had been used for 
speculation, it had provided little useful output for the economy. Allied demand for American 
agricultural goods began to decline dramatically, causing a fall in prices. This lower demand, 
coupled with the wartime expansions, created a surplus of agricultural goods. The inventory 
speculation which had been common collapsed. Consumers had experienced a decrease in 
purchasing power, which nleant surplus inventories continued to increase. 
In the early part of 1922, the economy once again began to expand. Though specific 
causes of this are somewhat nebulous, there are some generalities which can be examined. 
Firstly, businesses began again to expand their production. It may be assumed, then, that 
businessmen saw the opportunity to make profits because they remained in possession of large 
amounts of inventory which had been devalued, if on paper only. The prices between raw and 
finished goods remained sufficiently different to create profitability. A large portion of the 
expansion of 1919 was actually due to price increases alone. Of six billion dollars worth of 
expansion, four billion were actual gains in product, while two billion were due to price increases 
(Soule 112). As prices began to fall, the general public saw an increase in its purchasing power 
which was largely sufficient to allow for the purchase of many of the excess inventories. There 
was also a fifty percent increase in durable goods spending during this expansion which provided 
a stimulus to business (Soule 116). Many new durable goods became available during this period 
like the radio and the refrigerator. There was also an increase in automobile purchases, which 
would later impact state and local government spending on such things as roads and bridges. 
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Thus, new spending patterns led businessmen to believe that they would receive profits off new 
inventory purchases, fueling the expansion. 
Also vital to the expansion of 1922 was the increased building of private homes. This 
building boom utilized labor which had previously been unemployed and helped to further 
increase the purchasing power of the public. In addition, there were substantial gains in 
efficiency and productivity. As production in the overall economy increased and labor remained 
constant, there was a necessary rise in the ratio ofproduction per unit of labor. Consequently, 
there was a rise in the productivity of the labor force. Also contributing to this gain was the 
increased usage of electrical operations in manufacturing, usually from an outside provider. 
Horsepower per worker also increased. Because of a shortage of low-skilled, usually immigrant 
labor, machines were increasingly utilized to fill such roles. All these innovations furthered the 
efficiency gains in the economy. 
During this expansion, businesses received sufficient funds to finance their own 
expansionary endeavors. This freed banks to provide loan funding to other outlets. The increase 
in the availability of funding for loans facilitated an increase in stock and land speculation. 
While stock speculation continued throughout the decade, land speculation fell off very quickly 
as the result of failed endeavors in Muscle Shoals, Florida, and California. 
The governmental decisions of the decade also largely facilitated the growth of business 
in the economy. The Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act of 1922 allowed for tariffs that would bring 
the cost of foreign goods into line with those of domestic goods for American consumers. While 
it did not include many important industries such as automobiles, the tariff did signal a growing 
trend in United States' legislation. Another sign of the pro-business atmosphere was the 
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appointment of Andrew Mellon as Secretary of the Treasury under both Harding and Coolidge. 
Mellon, very conservative in his economics and one of the richest men in the country, instituted 
and supported policies including the reduction of taxes in the highest brackets, governmental 
surplus, and retirement of the debt (Soule 131). Calvin Coolidge was also largely responsible for 
the economically conservative policies of the time. He was opposed to both social reform and 
government spending. However, this is not always retlected in the actual expenditures of the 
federal government from 1920 to 1930. Only expenditures on health and welfare, interest on the 
debt, and public works were reduced, while law enforcement, shipping subsidies, and 
Department of Commerce programs all saw increases (Soule 132). Some of the increases, 
however, appear to be rather unavoidable. Law enforcement, for instance, increased due to the 
demands of prohibition. A large part of the decrease in public works can be explained by an 
increased action by the states and local governments in the areas of road and building 
construction. In 1930, the total tax burden from federal, state, and local requirements was $10.3 
billion, fifteen percent of which went to rural road construction and fourteen percent of which 
went to other city expenditures (Soule 133). Consuming more capital and labor than any other 
industry of the period, road and building construction was truly an important part of the economy 
from 1920 until 1930 (Soule 133). 
As part of the conservative approach to business and economics, the administrations of 
the twenties enforced antitrust regulation only mildly. During the era from 1925 to 1929, 
seventy-five cases were pursued. Thirty-seven ended in consent decrees, while another twelve 
were dropped (Soule 134). The Federal Trade Commission, begun in 1915 to regulate unfair 
competition, was largely unsuccessful in enforcing the newer Clayton Act requirements and only 
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mildly successful in prosecuting common law breaches. The Supreme Court appeared to share 
the conservative bent, upholding the practices of the United States Steel Corporation in 1920, 
despite the fact that the company controlled over fifty percent of the market share and had been 
created by a questionable merger (Soule 139). The conditions of business and antitrust 
regulation during the twenties made tacit collusion and price publishing schemes easy and 
acceptable. High entry barriers into large manufacturing endeavors, caused by the expense of 
machinery and other fixed costs, also contributed to the atmosphere of big business. 
A last important trend in the econonlY of the twenties was the expansion of consumer 
credit through installment payment plans. Companies began to use such plans as the reliance on 
financial and other credit agencies became more acceptable. It was utilized for the purchase of 
large durable and semi-durable goods, including radios and other new electrical appliances. It 
was estimated that in 1929 the cost of installments payments in the economy was roughly seven 
billion dollars (Soule 157). While this aided in business expansion and appeased the appetites of 
consumers, it would prove to be a costly mistake for the economy as a whole. Businesses failed 
to realize that durable goods would not be replaced at their initial purchase rate, which led to 
overproduction. 
These conditions prevailed largely uninterrupted throughout the decade of the nineteen 
twenties. The expansion was somewhat slowed by a mild recession in 1924, from which the 
economy had recovered by 1925. Following this, the economy grew substantially and provided 
sufficient fuel for this expansion until 1929. Around this time there was some indication that the 
economy was slowing. However, no one foresaw the stock market crash of 1929 that would 





The passage of national prohibition was met with wide-ranging sentiments. The drys 
heralded it as the beginning of a newer, cleaner, and holier era. The wets decried the law as an 
imposition and a farce. When the law went into effect on January 17, 1920 the Anti-Saloon 
League of New York praised it and prophesied that "a new nation will be born" (Asbury 142). 
However, the American Federation of Labor denounced the act and the Central Federation Union 
coined the phrase "No Beer, No Work" (Merz 46-47). There were other, more lavish, displays of 
emotions as well. Billy Sunday, a noted evangelist and dry worker, held a mock funeral in 
Virginia for John Barleycorn, praising his death and proclaiming his wickedness (Asbury 144). 
Wets chose much the same fashion of display to mark the end of their drinking days. In many of 
the hotels, cabarets, and restaurants of large cities such as New York and Chicago, there were 
funerals held for alcohol. Some were lavish displays including favors for guests and free 
champagne. Others involved the passing out of such items as flasks, which would certainly find 
good use shortly. 
The parties, however, seem to have paled in comparison to the predictions of the news 
media and others of the time. Police were stationed throughout cities, anticipating an increase in 
the amount of drinking, traffic, and general lawlessness. However, the short supply of alcohol 
put a serious damper on these activities. Because people had begun to stock up on their personal 
supplies weeks before, most establishments had a difficult time getting their hands on enough 
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liquor to put on a major party. However, some did manage to find just enough to meet their own 
needs. These owners raised the prices drastically, further reducing the amount of drinking taking 
place on the night of the sixteenth of January. For example, prior to prohibition, the price of a 
cocktail at a high class bar was fifteen cents; that night such drinks ran seriously higher, with an 
ounce of low quality whiskey going for up to three dollars (Asbury 150). The atmosphere in 
New York seems to have been most affected, with the New York Tribune reporting the "sad 
scenes witnessed on Broadway" (Asbury 151). However, there may be a further explanation for 
this. Apparently, mother nature did not support the cause of the wets and sent a twenty degree, 
windy, snowy night over the city. 
Immediately after prohibition went into effect, there began to be problems enforcing it. 
Many of these problems appear, in hindsight, to be inherent in the enforcement system that was 
created. Firstly, there were no additional jails, courts, or United States attorneys added in the 
expectation of increased case loads. This would prove to be a serious flaw. Furthermore, as 
Herbert Asbury has noted, the Prohibition Bureau was designated as a part of the Department of 
the Treasury rather than the Department of Justice (173). This would cause endless problems of 
non-cooperation throughout the term of the law. An additional problem was that the Bureau was 
staffed by employees who were not considered civil servants. Therefore, many of the positions 
went to party or political appointees as favors and this led to serious problems of bribery and 
corruption (Asbury 173). 
There were also many readily available sources for illegal liquor. One of the loopholes in 
the amendment was that there was an allowance for use of medicinal liquor to continue if 
prescribed by a physician. Widespread abuse of this allowance followed, with many doctors 
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writing fraudulent prescriptions for a fee. In addition, there was an allowance for "near" beer, 
with an alcohol content less than one-half of one percent. In order to create this drink, the 
fermentation process must produce alcohol of illegal levels. Enforcement of this was limited, 
and there was much near beer that was very close to its predecessors. Brewers were also known 
to sell alcohol that could be used to up the percentage of near beer following its inspection. 
Smuggled liquor was another major problem in enforcement of prohibition. Given the long 
boundaries of the United States with Canada and Mexico, the officers stationed in these areas 
were sadly insufficient in numbers and their actions were not well coordinated with other 
agencies (Merz 67). Industrial alcohol provided a fourth source of illegal liquor. Given the 
increased chemical industry in the United States following the war, there was a large supply of 
alcohol available for usage. However, this alcohol contained toxins and required denaturing to 
prevent death, which often never occurred. The last important source of illicit liquor was the 
still. A five hundred dollar still could make fifty to one hundred gallons of liquor a day, at a cost 
of fifty cents a gallon. This liquor could then be sold at anywhere from three to four dollars per 
gallon. 
However, the sources for illegal liquor would have been unimportant had there not been a 
demand for it. Though many dry leaders believed the national sentiment to be behind them, they 
misjudged the public seriously. Colonel Daniel Porter went so far as to proclaim "There will not 
be any violations to speak of," believing the penalties were so severe as to prevent this 
occurrence (Asbury 142). The common person of the day, while holding little hard alcohol at 
home, was a beer and other light liquor consumer. Furthermore, they had the knowledge to allow 
them to brew their own supplies fairly easily. Many found the law so odious as to break it 
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without consideration. Senator Owen Stanley demonstrated this sentiment when he read into the 
Congressional record the Song ofthe Moonshiners, a popular song of the day. "My country tis of 
thee/ land of grape juice and teal of thee I sing/ land where we all have tried/ to break the laws 
and lied! from every mountainside/ the bootlegs spring" (Behr 131). This sense of disobedience 
shocked law enforcement officials of the time, for they believed it would lead to a more general 
rash of lawlessness. Perhaps they were right. People began to judge the norms of society 
differently than they had prior to prohibition. Bootleggers and smugglers were not criminals, but 
mere businessmen, providing a service which should never have been outlawed in the first place. 
Pocket flasks and home stills became hot commodities throughout the country, despite their 
illegal status. Women, just enfranchised, flocked to bars and speakeasies in numbers that would 
have been appalling just weeks earlier. Drinking had become socially acceptable and, in some 
quarters, expected. College boys, who before would never have thought to bring alcohol on a 
date, let alone offer it to a girl, were thought ungentlemanly if they did not do so. Not only did 
drinking move into the female sector, it moved to the younger population as well. Speakeasies 
and stills were set up just off of college and high school campuses, for the easy consumption of 
the students. Alcohol was a popular drink and status symbol. The common boast from boys 
everywhere was, "Boy, did I tie one on last night" (Asbury 160). During all this, the demand for 
illegal liquor rose, as did the profits to those who provided it. 
Those establishments which wished to remain within the bounds of the law, however, 
suffered. Hotels which had counted on the revenues from their bars to keep them operating were 
hurt badly. Restaurants could not make a profit from food alone and were forced to close 
without their most profitable menu item. The Broadway district ofNew York was extremely 
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hard hit. Its reputation preceding the Volstead Act had been one of raucous entertainment. 
However, within six years after the passage ofprohibition "virtually everything that had made 
Broadway famous was gone" (Asbury 190). These establishments were replaced by low cost 
operations which cheapened the atmosphere considerably. They included night clubs (often with 
a backroom speakeasy), drug stores, and lunch counters. Such famous landmarks as the Hotel 
Knickerbocker, Manhattan Hotel, and the Park Avenue were closed. Others, such as the Astor 
and the Vanderbilt, remained opened but leased out parts of the space to vendors of candy and 
other favors. 
The benefits of prohibition were also well noted. Professor Irving Fisher claimed that 
prohibition led to increased labor productivity. These gains, according to Fisher, were only half 
of the six billion dollar benefit caused by prohibition (Feldman 235). The Scientific Temperance 
Federation released a pamphlet which claimed that prohibition had been responsible for the turn­
around in the U.S. economy, leading to larger bank accounts and increased consumption. Labor 
turnover was also a significant gain, according to proponents of prohibition. Apparently, it was 
believed that less drunkenness led to fewer firings and, thus, created a stable labor pool. 
The passage ofprohibition had undoubtedly changed American society. However, the 
full affect of that change would not be felt for years. With drys heralding the dawn of a new age 
and wets preparing their speakeasies and stills, the country was pushed into a new social 






In the atmosphere ofprohibition organized crime gained a foothold. However, organized 
crime is a rather vague term. Is any group of criminals an organization? Most of the time the 
reference to organized crime is to a group of criminals that styles itself on the tradition of the 
Italian mafia. Modem examples of organized crime have challenged this assumption, but for the 
period ofprohibition it remains valid. If American organized crime was based, admittedly 
loosely, on the structure of the mafia, it is necessary to understand the causes and history of this 
phenomenon. 
Through movies, popular fiction, and events such as the Kefauver hearings, organized 
crime has become legendary in America. It has also come to be synonymous with the mafia and 
Italian-Americans. However, this equation is somewhat dubious. Throughout the years, several 
ethnic groups have been dominant in organized crime. At any given time, people of all 
ethnicities are involved. It is useful to examine the roots of the Italian mafia, however, in order 
to evaluate whether American organized crime has significant similarities to it. 
In order to understand the origins of the Sicilian-based mafia, it is necessary to dissect the 
Southern Italian psyche in the nineteenth century. Perhaps the factor most responsible for 
molding this rather unique mind set was the political upheaval that was almost constant in the 
region. For centuries, both Sicily and Southern Italy were subjected to a succession of invasions. 
Each of these left behind a government which cared little for the native peasantry. This was 
especially so during the time between the Congress of Vienna and the 1860s, during which time 
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the Bourbons fled (Nelli 5). The rule by the Bourbons had been haphazard at best. Corruption, 
weakened governmental power, and overall lawlessness marked the period (Nelli 5). However, 
even the later unification of Italy provided little relief for the Southern poor. Elizabeth Latimer 
wrote in the 1890s that "the Sicilian and Neapolitan peasantry have been a disaffected population 
ever since the formation of the Kingdom of Italy (Nelli 5). Under this new unified government 
some classes of Italians prospered while others suffered. Economic hardship was especially 
prevalent in the agricultural south. Farmers there were subjected to incredibly high rates of 
taxation and usurious rates for the privilege of borrowing money. The result was a barrier to 
economic self-improvement and an increased distrust of government. 
The Southern Italians and Sicilians turned instead to their immediate families to provide 
the protection and opportunities a just government would have. These family units became 
powerful within the communities and attempted to alleviate some of the governmental burdens. 
In exchange, all members of the family were expected to protect other members and hold family 
secrets in strict confidence. Outside the immediate family, all people were regarded with 
distrust. What emerged from this environment was one man who was protector of and speaker 
for many, called capo mafioso (Nelli 7). He then led the mafia, which operated as a kind of new 
government. 
From this new government, which often ignored the laws of the legitimate government, 
the mafias's criminal nature grew. Most chapters were rural and operated within their own town. 
They provided their services to collect rents, organize labor, and protect business, backing their 
authority with violence (Nelli 11). The economic and social structures continued by the mafia 
were much like feudalism and slowed market development in Sicily (Nelli 13). To protect their 
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interests they bought local officials by bribing them and then using a demand of returned favor to 
get what they wanted (Nelli 13). This technique would become ever more important in America. 
However, this analysis is only one theory of the development of the mafia. There are 
numbers of contradictory ones. Some date the origins of the mafia to the early or middle 
nineteenth century. One of the most colorful examples of a theory was retold by Joe Bonanno in 
his A Man ofHonor. According to this legend, the mafia was a revolutionary response to the 
rape of a Palermo bride on her wedding day by a French soldier. Italians began to slaughter other 
soldiers in response and violence spread through the country. It is also said that mothers cried in 
the streets "My daughter, my daughter" or "mafia, mafia" (Sifakis 210). Obviously, those 
involved with present day mafia activities prefer this noble tale to one of savage and greedy 
criminals. 
As difficult as pinpointing the historical origins of the mafia is determining its true 
relationship to American organized crime. Some scholars have hinted that the present structure 
is merely a transplant of the Italian-based criminal activities, brought by immigrants. However, 
there are several problems with this hypothesis. Firstly, there are the various regional origins of 
the most notable Italian-American crime bosses. Vito Genovese, for example, was a Neapolitan . 
This area was largely known, not for the mafia, but for a criminal ring known as the Camorra 
(Homer 38). Frank Costello's origins, however, were Calabrian. Calabria was far from Sicily 
and the mafia. Indeed, it was noted for a gang know as the Onorata Societa (Homer 38). If the 
mafia in America were merely a transplant of a single organization in Italy, one would expect the 
leaders who set up the American structure to at least be from the same general region. The 
second major problem with the assumption that the American mafia is merely a duplicate of 
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another system is that any number of ethnicities have been prominent in organized crime in 
America throughout the years. Italians were by no means predominant in the nineteenth century 
and there is some doubt that they were at any point. In fact, as Carl Sifakis points out, in 1931 
when Lucky Luciano was attempting to take syndicate crime national, it is quite possible that 
Jewish criminals outnumbered Italians (207). What, then, determines the ethnic make up of 
organized crime? Frederic Homer in Guns and Garlic identified four requirements that may 
signal an ethnic proclivity for organized crin1e: 1) hostility toward government 2) social norms of 
secrecy 3) systematical violence 4) entrepreneurial tendencies (67). From merely a brief history 
of Italy it may be reasonably assumed that each of these are present. It is also apparent, however, 
that Italians are not the only ethnicity for which that is true. Perhaps that may provide an 
explanation for the involvement and control at various times by other groups such as the Irish or 
Jewish. Like the Italians, for instance, both the Irish and the Jews had been oppressed 
economically in Europe. The Irish arrived earlier and this may explain their early predominance 
in crime. Both the Italians and the Jews began to arrive in large numbers around the same time 
and, perhaps consequently, became involved in organized crime during the same era. Like 
virtually all ethnic groups which came in mass to America, these groups were ostracized and 
confined to ethnically bounded neighborhoods. Sometimes involvement could also be 
attributable to certain skill, such as brewing, which come to be an important element in crime. 
However, this explanation of ethnic succession fails to explain why the Italian mafia has 
become synonymous with the organization in America. Carl Sifakis offers an explanation for 
this which, while far from completely explaining the phenomenon, does offer a contributing 
factor. His theory is that with the coming of the Great Depression, Italians and Jews were unable 
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to move out of the ghettos and, therefore, remained involved in organized crime longer than 
would have been usual (Sifakis 208). Not to be underestimated in this association of the Italian 
with organized criminal is the popular culture. Movies, books, television shows- all reinforce the 
idea that the mafia is organized crinle in America. With all the confusion, even in academic 
circles, it is simple to see why this myth has stuck. 
The Practice 
Long before prohibition was even contemplated, organizations such as the mafia had 
begun to operate in the United States. These gangs were smaller and less focused on monetary 
gain than their descendants would be, but they provided useful practice for the young gangsters 
who would come to rule during prohibition. Control of the docks and labor slugging provided 
perhaps the first indication that crime could be run as a business. Other endeavors taught more 
specific lessons. All these things, however, produced a generation of criminals that was eager 
and able to take over the sale of illicit liquor in order to gain huge profits. 
Organized crime established itself within American society well before Prohibition 
became law. The large majority of participants in these illegal activities were members of 
distinct ethnic groups and newly immigrated (Nelli 103). While the majority of new immigrants 
encouraged their children to work hard and assimilate themselves into society, some of these 
children found that difficult. Especially for the poorest, the immersion into the crime-ridden 
slums so affected them that they failed to see the value in slow and hard work which brought 
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small earnings. Often their difficulties, both with language and culture, led to ostracism from 
mainstream American society. The children who turned to crime usually found school within the 
foreign environment exceedingly difficult. These young men joined street gangs, which were 
common in American cities around the tum of the century. Such gangs would become the 
recruiting grounds of large syndicate crime during Prohibition. One such gang was the Five 
Points Gang, which has been called the "last great pre-Prohibition gang in New York" (Sifakis 
121). Men1bers of this gang included Lucky Luciano, Al Capone, and Johnny Torrio, all of 
whom would become infamous following the passage of the Volstead Act. Largely Italian, this 
gang was very different from the majority of street gangs which had ruled the streets of American 
cities around the tum of the century. It was from this gang that more modern day gangs would 
come following the advent of Prohibition, and its identity has greatly influenced the concept of 
American organized crime (Sifakis 121). 
Prior to the lucrative trade in illicit liquor that was created by passage of the Volstead 
Act, organized crime focused its attention on a number of various endeavors. Perhaps the earliest 
of these, and the ones most closely related to mafia activity in Italy, was control of docks and 
their workers through union and labor racketeering. Surprisingly, this undertaking was first 
almost solely the realm of Irish leaders. According to The Longshoremen, a study by Charles B. 
Barnes, almost ninety-five percent of dock workers in 1920 were Irish (Nelli 109). However, 
other ethnicities began to enter the industry rather quickly. One of the most notable persons 
among these was Paul Kelly. Kelly was the leader of the Five Points Gang, which was also 
notable for its violence. In his position of leadership, Kelly was involved prior to World War I in 
hiring out his troops to the union organizers and busters alike. Following the eventual collapse 
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of his gang, Kelly moved into a new field, one which Humbert Nelli has called "lucrative", that 
of labor racketeering (Nelli 109). Using his power over labor, Kelly was able to hold potential 
strikes over employers' heads in order to extort money from them. The change from Irish control 
to Italian brought several innovations with it. Italians used superior organization and an 
increased indifference to violence in order to produce an industry which became highly 
profitable, especially in its more nefarious aspects such as smuggling. 
Also essential to pre-Prohibition organized crime was its involvement in various industry 
competitions. Especially during the "newspaper wars" such involvement was apparent. One 
such encounter came to light during the 1951 Kefauver hearings. During 1913, the Cleveland 
newspaper industry was involved in fierce competition, divided between the News and the 
Leader and their rivals the Plain Dealer and the Press (Nelli 110). During this period various 
small time organized criminals were hired to manage groups of other gang members. These 
bands of boys were subsequently used to run the rival newspaper boys off their comers. 
Consequently, there was less circulation for rival newspapers. This was not at all uncommon in 
American cities during the period, and it provided a useful model for future organization 
endeavors. 
Perhaps most lucrative and widespread, however, was the organized criminals' 
involvement in prostitution and gambling. Such endeavors were the mainstay for the organized 
criminal before illicit liquor provided a fertile field for profit. Essential for the working of such 
industry was the existence of the political machine. Such machines required huge voter tum out 
in order to be successful. The organized criminals agreed to provide such a turn-out in exchange 
for a blind eye turned upon their gambling or prostitution houses. In addition to guaranteeing a 
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high favorable voter turn out, such criminals were also instrumental in keeping away negative 
voters for those politicians who agreed to be less than vigilant in their law enforcement duties. 
Not only did criminals receive a ticket to operate their illegal businesses fronl the political 
machine, but they were often given appointments as favors as well. 
Though gambling was probably just as profitable, it never truly became a focus of social 
outcry as did prostitution. In 1897, it was estimated that in New York City alone there were 
30,000 prostitutes (Nelli 115). Numbers from the city of Chicago a few years later prove that 
prostitution was a very lucrative industry. In 1911 the Vice Commission of Chicago said 
prostitution was a "commercial business of large proportions with tremendous profits of $15 
million a year" (Nelli 115). Even using the more conservative estimate of the Department of 
Justice's Howard Woolston that there were 100,000 prostitutes in the United States between the 
years of 1911 and 1913 the estimated profits produced would be considerable (Nelli 115). Often 
the contemporary discussion of prostitution centered around the concept of white slavery. Widely 
accepted, white slavery was a belief that thousands of innocent girls were being held against their 
will in the life of prostitution. Though not all operators ofprostitution houses were directly tied 
to what is traditionally thought of as organized crime, several notable ones were. According to 
Humbert Nelli the "first and largest" prostitution ring was that which belonged to Jim Colosimo 
and Johnny Torrio (119). Torrio, born in Italy and raised in New York, was a member of the 
Five Points Gang and operated several saloons in Brooklyn. When brought west to Chicago by 
Jim Colosimo, Torrio quickly developed into the great criminal mind which would later make 
him famous. Quickly gaining Colosimo's respect, he began to be the real driving force behind 
Colosimo's prostitution empire. Jim Colosimo had built his criminal career by becoming a bribe 
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"collector for two infamous, corrupt aldermen, Michael 'Hinky Dink' Kenna and Bathhouse John 
Coughlin" (Sifakis 83). He later moved on to be a bagman for the numerous brothels who bribed 
Kenna and Coughlin for their complacency. Colosimo's big break, however, came when he met 
Victoria Moresco, a madam. She made Jim her husband and the manager of her brothel and soon 
its business was boonling. Of every two dollars a prostitute brought in, Colosimo took $1.20, 
and quickly becanle a millionaire (Sifakis 84). He also became a target for Black Hand 
extortionists. Black Hand operations were the first involvement of Italian Americans in 
organized crime. They involved extortion, almost always targeted at other successful Italians. 
Fearing they would eat away his fortune, Colosimo brought Torrio to Chicago in 1909 to act as 
his protector. Torrio would soon take over the true operations of the crime ring and lead it in a 
new direction. 
Though Colosimo's group was probably the largest of its time, with his income estimated 
at about $600,000 a year, it was certainly not the only crime ring involved in prostitution (Nelli 
122). Italians alone were involved in prostitution rings in Philadelphia, Boston, Milwaukee, 
Denver, and San Francisco. When one considers the other ethnic groups and individuals which 
were also involved, it become clear that prostitution was a huge criminal moneymaker. It is also 
quickly apparent that many of those involved in prostitution would later move on to bootlegging 
following Prohibition. Lucky Luciano, Jim Colosimo, and Johnny Torrio are examples of this, as 
is Anthony Parmagini, a whorehouse operator and future bootlegger in San Francisco (Nelli 121). 
Such endeavors involved not only the day to day maintenance of prostitution houses and their 
inhabitants, but the organization of numbers of such establishments and the exchange of girls in 
between the various houses. Apparently the clientele, especially that of higher class 
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establishments, liked variety in their prostitutes and were willing to pay for it. To that end, 
several of the larger prostitution rings cooperated with each other to exchange girls between them 
(Nelli 122). 
Other illegal activities provided valuable experience for the criminals who would later 
organize and profit from the illegal sales of liquor. Counterfeiting, though mostly a small 
operation, was a part of the organized criminal's repertoire prior to Prohibition. The experience 
this provided would prove to be highly lucrative as one could counterfeit liquor labels and 
consequently sell rotgut liquor at exorbitant prices (Nelli 125). In addition to specific skills, 
criminals also learned a great deal about organization during this time. Though the union 
involvement prior to World War I had provided much of this, their training was not complete. 
Much of that came with the organization and professionalization of gambling by John "Old 
Smoke" Morrissey (Nelli 126). He was a useful example, if not the first, to attempt such an 
endeavor. The honor of being first goes to Michael Cassus McDonald, Harry Varnell, and the 
Hankins brothers of Chicago who, in 1870, organized gambling interests to elect a synlpathetic 
mayor and monopolize the industry (Nelli 127). 
Indeed, much of the framework for the big organized crime rings of the twenties and 
thirties was laid in the first decade of the century. Crime and its ceremony, so important to the 
immigrant youths, began to take on the kind of social importance which would later accompany 
the flashy weddings and funerals in crime families. The pay structure of the organization was 
also clearly established within this time period. Leaders were paid a percentage of the groups 
earnings, with their power increasing as their wealth did. Several early endeavors provided 
specific know-how and opportunities for experience in organization and illegal profit making. 
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Five Points gang leader Paul Kelly 
As Humbert Nelli has put it, "adjustment to American values became an effort to apply certain 
big business practices" to criminal activities (139). Thus, the coming years would see highly 
organized groups of criminals using ideas of efficiency, specialization, and monopoly through 
elimination to profit from illegal liquor sales. 
The Game 
The criminals who came of age just prior to the passage of prohibition were a renlarkable 
combination of brains and violence. Together they would use these characteristics in concert to 
create the very lucrative business that bootlegging soon became. Before one can understand, 
however, the methods which such men used to run their business, it is necessary to outline some 
of the faces and events that were central to the crime culture of the time. This will provide the 
activities for analysis. 
Virtually no one saw prohibition as a panacea. Most people knew and accepted that there 
would be those who broke the newly established law. However, the majority failed to foresee the 
full extent of the lawlessness which would sweep the largest American cities. Almost all of the 
major urban areas in the country had their problems with bootlegging and gangs. Detroit became 
a port of entry for Canadian alcohol. Cleveland, with its long history of beer-drinking, was far 
from dry. New York was a city full of both smuggled and bootlegged liquor. However, perhaps 
no other city is associated with the organized crime of the era more than Chicago. 
Other cities had rival gangs and big name leaders. They had their raids, their wars, and 
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their flashy social events. However, they did not have Al Capone and they never experienced the 
kind of gang warfare that would mar Chicago in the late twenties, with an estimated 1000 men 
dying (Sifakis 44). Between October of 1923 and October of 1926, Chicago saw the killings of 
215 gangsters (Landesco 97). It was in Chicago that the St. Valentine's Day massacre, perhaps 
the most notable event in organized crime, took place. Chicago was not the birthplace of 
American organized crime. However, it did provide the template for many of America's myths 
about organized crime and criminals. It was there that the gangster became legend and the 
twenties really roared. 
Perhaps Chicago would not have become any of these things without the leadership of 
one man. Johnny Torrio, well-known for his brains and tact, brought in to protect Jim Colosimo 
from extortionists, would prove to be the spiritual and intellectual leader for the new Chicago 
mobster. With news of impending prohibition, Torrio immediately sensed that there were 
immense profits to be made in bootlegging and other related activities. He attempted to persuade 
the master of Chicago's prostitution rings to diversify his interests and move into alcohoL 
Colosimo, distracted by his interest in a new love, refused Torrio's suggestion. Enraged by his 
boss's response, Torrio began to make his own plans. 
He contacted his former partner, Frankie Yale, a small time gangster in New York and 
Brooklyn. Much the same as he had been called west by Colosimo, Torrio brought Yale to 
Chicago. In 1920, Yale arrived. He would prove to be Torrio's answer. On May 11, for a 
reported ten thousand dollars, Yale shot Jim Colosimo to death in his own cafe (Asbury 294). 
Torrio, now the leader of the largest prostitution ring in the Midwest, was free to enter any 
business he chose. His choice was a wise one. 
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In 1920 Torrio began to organize his operation, the former Colosimo prostitution ring, for 
expansion into the business of bootlegging. The first, and probably one of the most important, 

decisions Torrio would make that summer would be to supply Al Capone with ajob in Chicago. 

The young man, then twenty-three, was working in one of Yale's establishments in Brooklyn. 

He had written Torrio asking for ajob, which Torrio gladly gave him, knowing his skills with a 

pistol and penchant for violence. Initially, Capone was employed as a bouncer in one of Torrio's 

brothels (Asbury 295). However, he nl0ved up quickly, and was soon the manager of the Four 

Deuces, another Torrio establishment. In just over one year he would ascend to a spot as 

T orrio' s chief gunman. 

Torrio also busied himself with the organization of the illegal liquor industry in Chicago. 
By the time he was free to enter the business, prohibition had already taken effect. However, 
throughout the country manufacture and sale of illicit alcohol was going on, if only on a small 
scale. Those brewers who did not wish to remain in operation were eager for buyers, almost as 
eager as Torrio was to buy (Landesco 97). The Unione Siciliana, an "Italian fraternal group" was 
supplying alcohol compliments of their influence (chiefly extortion threats) over other Italian 
citizens (Nelli 135). Small time gangsters throughout the city were attempting to take their share 
of the profits to be made in bootlegging. However, there was no organization to any of these 
schemes. This would prove to be Torrio's strength. Fearing law enforcement little, boasting "I 
own the police," Torrio proceeded to make his first big move (Asbury 296). Deciding that beer 
was the drink of choice in Chicago, Torrio attempted to gain influence over the small number of 
breweries that had continued to operate following the incorporation of prohibition. Torrio also 
formed an alliance with the Unione Siciliana, and added their alcohol production to his supply. 
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Connecting himself with Joseph Stenson, owner of five Chicago breweries, he immediately took 
them over for his own operation (Asbury 297). The alliance would prove profitable for Stenson, 
as well. His prohibition era income was estimated at almost twelve million dollars a year 
(Landesco 91). Gradually, Torrio absorbed most of the formerly legitimate breweries and 
distilleries in Chicago. 
The acquisitions would be of little use, however, if Torrio could not convince other gang 
leaders to cooperate with him. This ability alone was what would single Torrio out as a great 
organizer. He convinced the other gang leaders of Chicago that the area should be divided into 
sections, with each gang having supremacy in one section and the rights to its profits. Promising 
the men that they would "all make millions," Torrio further solidified the compact (Sifakis 322). 
However, the enforcement behind the deal was Torrio's all but explicit threat that "the 
altemative ... was war and he would win that" (Sifakis 322). Chicago and the Cook County area, 
therefore, were divided. 
Dion O'Banion and his gang, specialists in robbery, were given control of the lucrative 
North Side. O'Banion was a ruthless, but well-protected, killer. According to the Chicago 
police, he had participated in the killings of at least twenty-five men (Asbury 298). It was 
furthered rumored that O'Banion committed these acts "with a rosary in his pocket and a 
carnation in his buttonhole" (Sifakis 247). However, he was never held accountable for his 
crimes, at least not by the police. The West Side was divided among Torrio, Myles and Klondike 
O'Donnell, Frankie Lake and Terry Druggan, and the Genna brothers. The Genna brothers were 
high officials in the Unione Siciliana, and already busy manufacturing alcohol. With the division 
of power and territory, they were allowed to continue their activities and in time would become 
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the most prolific bootleggers in Chicago. By 1925, they had amassed a fortune of five million 
dollars and were making $350,000 a month off illegal liquor, one hundred fifty thousand dollars 
of which was said to be profit (Asbury 298). By passing out stills to Italian immigrants and 
extorting the liquor, the Gennas were able to keep their costs low, assuring themselves of profit. 
The South Side also remained under Torrio's control. Al Capone was employed to rule over it 
for him. Pieces of the territory were parceled out to Danny Stanton, Ralph Sheldon, Polack Joe 
Saltis, and Frank McErlane. McErlane, called by the Illinois Association for Criminal Justice 
"the most brutal gunman who ever pulled a trigger in Chicago," was an easily identifiable figure 
with his ruddy complexion and small, piggish eyes (Asbury 298). 
As brilliant as Torrio was, he did make a mistake in dividing Chicago, one that would be 
costly. Because Spike O'Donnell was in jail at the time, Torrio neglected to provide his brothers, 
Steve, Walter, and Tommy, with any territory. Working only under Spike, the three brothers had 
become pickpockets and robbers. However, they did not protest about Torrio's treatment of 
them. When Spike was pardoned in 1923, he was outraged that Torrio had ignored his presence, 
and set out to get even. He hijacked Torrio trucks filled with booze and began to run beer in 
through Joliet to the South Side, infringing on the McErlane area (Asbury 299). Torrio, 
unwilling to compromise the existing negotiation, ordered his gunmen to control the situation. 
McErlane and a gang of gunmen surrounded five members of the gang, but only managed to kill 
one (Asbury 299). Though they would kill others in the months to come, they never succeeded in 
killing Spike. He left Chicago to return shortly and become a member of Capone's organization. 
During the O'Donnell war, Torrio began to see Cicero, a suburb of Chicago, as the logical 
area for expansion of his activities. The town of fifty thousand had numerous saloons which had 
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remained open following prohibition and were an outlet for Myles and Klondike O'Donnell 
(Asbury 301). Initially, Torrio planned to send prostitutes into the area, expanding his still 
existing ring. The only block to his expansion was the slots machines in the town run by Eddie 
Vogel. When Torrio sent in prostitutes, these machines were promptly confiscated in the 
subsequent raid, leading to Vogel's objection to Torrio's presence. Though Torrio continued to 
send in women, they were all removed from the area. Seeing the opportunity for another 
compromise, Torrio agreed to let Vogel's slot machines operate without his interference, secured 
exclusive liquor privileges for the O'Donnell's, and maintained for himself gambling rights, 
agreeing to make no more attempts to bring in prostitutes (Asbury 301). 
Eventually, Capone was put in charge of the Cicero operations. He would be influential 
in the mayoral race of 1924, securing the office for Joseph Klenha by the employment of over 
200 gunmen (Asbury 302). With a sympathetic administration in place, gangsters throughout the 
Chicago area saw Cicero as a safe haven for their leisure activity. The city saw its saloons 
multiply by five times and was home to two hundred gambling houses (Asbury 302). The 
prostitution and gambling houses of the area were owned or operated by the Torrio-Capone 
organization, and generally paid them about fifty percent of their earnings (Asbury 302). In 
Cicero, Torrio and Capone had found a golden goose. Capone's net income was estimated at 
sixty million dollars a year, at least two thirds of which was from bootlegging (Asbury 292). 
With the small administration securely in their pocket, they were free to run their operations as 
they saw fit. Torrio ran beer through Cicero at fifty dollars a barrel, which included a charge for 
protection (Landesco 86). With Capone, he owned twenty-five brothels, fifty gambling houses, 
sixty-five breweries, and several distilleries (Asbury 303). By 1923 Torrio's payroll was $25,000 
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a month (Landesco 89). 
This was the highest time in Chicago organized crime. There was peace in the division 
provided by Torrio, now that Spike O'Donnell had been contained. Virtually all participants 
were making millions. The police were of little or no concern, with most of them in the gangs' 
pockets. However, this peace could not last. The alliances formed by Torrio were enforced by 
threat of violence only. Eventually, someone would test this threat. 
Dion O'Banion would be this man. Upset that his help during the Cicero takeover had 
been largely ignored, O'Banion threatened to upset the order of gangland. Torrio gave him a 
large stake in Cicero, but he still remained indignant. He accused the Gennas of selling poor 
quality liquor in his territory and undercutting his prices. Torrio did nothing to help. O'Banion 
set out on his own to reclaim his territory. He hijacked the Gennas' trucks and stole their 
alcohol. The Gennas reacted by swearing to kill O'Banion. They were stopped only by Torrio 
and Mike Merlo, head of the Chicago Unione Siciliana (Asbury 303). Angry that Torrio had 
interfered, O'Banion double-crossed the leader in a liquor deal. After selling a brewery he 
owned to Torrio, O'Banion informed federal agents that Torrio would be there leading to his 
subsequent arrest for a second prohibition violation (Asbury 304). 
Unwilling to see the peace he had worked so hard for disappear, Torrio did not retaliate. 
Hymie Weiss, a member of the O'Banion gang, urged his leader to rejoin the peaceful gangland 
order. However, Dion refused. Making a fatal mistake, he replied in anger, "Oh, to hell with 
them Sicilians!" (Asbury 304). Seeing this as an ethnic slur, Italians in the ranks of other gangs 
began to plan O'Banion's death. With the death of Merlo in 1924, the gangs lost their 
peacemaker and O'Banion lost his last chance. Around noon on Noverrlber 19, O'Banion was 
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working in his flower shop when three men entered. He greeted them in what appeared to be a 
friendly manner, according to a witness. As they shook hands, one of the men pulled O'Banion 
off balance and the others shot him to death (Asbury 304). It is widely believed that the chief 
gunman in the operation was Frankie Yale, once again called to Chicago on Torrio's wishes 
(Asbury 305). 
In true gang fashion, Hymie Weiss vowed to avenge O'Banion's death by killing Capone, 
Torrio, and the Gennas. Though Torrio was frightened and took a trip abroad for almost two 
nl0nths, upon his return to Chicago, the North Siders made good on their threats. On January 24, 
as he crossed the street by his house, Torrio was shot five times (Asbury 305). Hit in the jaw, 
chest, arm, and stomach, Torrio spent several weeks recuperating. Following his release, he 
served nine months injail for the prohibition violation set up by O'Banion. While injail, Torrio 
transferred his properties to Al Capone in a deal worth millions. The organization Capone took 
over that day employed 1,000 men with a weekly payroll of $300,000 (Sifakis 61). Torrio fled to 
Italy and never returned to Chicago following his release from jail. 
War had come to gangland with the killing ofO'Banion and the retaliation against Torrio. 
The alliances which had kept crime relatively peaceful were broken with the ascension of Capone 
to the role of leader. Capone lost several loyal allies to the North Siders, including McErlane and 
Klondike 0 'Donnell. Following the redrawing of sides, it became apparent that the indifference 
Torrio had shown to ethnicity had vanished. Frederic Homer has pointed to this distrust of other 
ethnicities as a constant and historical problem within Italian organized crime (Homer 73). 
Crime was now "more or less the Italians and Sicilians against the field" (Asbury 306). Weiss 
and his allies tried futilely to kill Capone. In September of 1926, they attacked the Hawthorne 
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Inn in Cicero, Capone's headquarters. Though civilians were injured and bullet holes peppered 
the area, Capone escaped unharmed. 
The police, sensing that what little order had existed was slipping away, called a meeting 
between the two criminal factions. Capone offered peace, but Weiss refused unless Albert 
Anselmi and John Scalisi, the men he felt were responsible for O'Banion's death, were turned 
over to him (Asbury 308). Unwilling to sacrifice useful allies, Capone refused and Weiss turned 
his back on peace. On October 11, 1926 Weiss met his own violent end when he was machine­
gunned by Capone gunmen on his way to O'Banion's flower shop (Asbury 308). Following a 
short and unremarkable period of leadership by Schemer Drucci, the North Siders came under the 
control of Bugs Moran. 
It was in the new headquarters of Moran that the climax of the gangland beer wars would 
occur. On February 14, 1929, several of Moran's members and one civilian fascinated with 
gang life arrived in the garage to await a shipment of liquor from Detroit. Outside a car stopped, 
and six men dressed as policemen exited. After entering the garage, the men pulled guns and 
disarmed the gangsters. The North Siders were lined up against the wall and each one was shot, 
first by machine gun spray, then by shotgun, and finally by a single pistol shot to the head 
(Asbury 308). Moran, however, was not present and escaped death. 
Public outrage against this event was strong. The change in mood was sufficient to warn 
gang leaders throughout the country. Aware that the alliances that had more or less held together 
throughout the decade were corroding, the leaders of gangs nationwide held a conference in 
Atlantic City. In May of 1929, there was reallotment of power in Chicago and a new division of 
power on the East cost (Asbury 309). For years the gangs would abide by these treaties, despite 
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minor outbreaks of violence. 
Not to be outdone by Chicago, New York was also a major center for prohibition era 
crime and gangs. If Chicago's fame was based on violence, New York's was based on big 
names, flashy clubs, and lots and lots of money. Organized crime in New York was also far 
nl0re ethnically diverse than Chicago's with Irish, Jewish, and Italian criminals working together. 
The list of who's who in New York's organized crime bears this out. Perhaps most 
influential was Arnold Rothstein, a well known gambler. Rothstein, as revealed after his death, 
was the man responsible for fixing the 1919 World Series. During prohibition he was the backer 
for numerous criminals, as well as the owner of several well know clubs and speakeasies such as 
the Cotton Club. Known as the "underworld's big money man," Rothstein was a sort of lending 
institution for criminals and gangs (Asbury 201). In exchange for his money, Rothstein 
demanded an exorbitant interest rate as well as a large portion of the profits of any endeavor. His 
investments were protected through threat ofviolence - he always got his money. 
Owney Madden was one of Rothstein's partners. Madden was born in Hell's Kitchen and 
made his name as a pickpocket and extortionist. Known as the "little bandy rooster out of hell," 
Madden had already established himself well before prohibition began (Sifakis 204). Though he 
was in jail at the beginning ofprohibition, he did not miss his chance to get involved following 
his release. He became partners with Rothstein in the famous Cotton Club and quickly 
reinforced his reputation (Asbury 204). 
Another well known nightclub owner and underworld leader was Dutch Schultz. Schultz 
was perhaps the most unpredictable of the organized criminals, apt to do or say anything. He was 
the owner of the Embassy Club (Asbury 202). A pemly-pinching, profit driven criminal, Schultz 
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quickly gained power. Before the end of prohibition he controlled the majority of the beer trade 
in the Bronx. However, his reckless behavior made him a liability to the organization and he was 
shot to death. 
Though not explicitly agreed upon, New York had its geographical divisions for 
bootlegging in much the same manner as Chicago. Like Schultz, certain gangsters gained 
preeminence in various regions of the city. Frankie Yale, the man whose services Torrio so often 
relied on, gained power in Brooklyn. He was the first of the New York gangsters to bring liquor 
into the city from the rum fleets which floated in the harbor (Asbury 203). His position as owner 
of the Harvard Club also allowed him a ready outlet for his products. Manhattan was controlled 
by Frankie Marlow. Marlow began his career with Yale, but quickly gained his own reputation 
and power. In time, he handled all beer sales from Harlem to Forty-Second Street (Asbury 203). 
Other New York gangsters specialized in the importation of illicit alcohol. Larry Fay was 
one such criminal. Fay was a small time thug who owned a sometimes legitimate taxi cab 
company. With the advent of prohibition, Fay found a niche for himself. Using his taxis, he 
could easily smuggle Canadian liquor into New York for resale inside the city. Even more 
colorful, however, were the methods ofWaxey Gordon. Gordon was mostly involved in crime in 
the New Jersey suburbs of the city. He smuggled his liquor from both Nova Scotia and the 
Bahamas. He faced problems with the law, despite his payoffs to those in power, however. In 
response Gordon bribed the city officials in Elizabeth, Paterson, and Union City, ran a huge pipe 
system through the sewers and pumped the liquor in through it (Sifakis 142). 
The reals brains behind New York's organized crime, however, belonged to two lifelong 
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smaller Lansky when both were children. Lansky proved to be a worthy opponent and the two 
became allies. Luciano was a top man in the Masseria organization during prohibition. Masseria 
was warring with the rival Maranzano organization, and Luciano saw his opportunity to remove 
the old gangsters from the American crime scene. He engineered a way in which both bosses 
could be eliminated and then took over the operations for himself and the younger generation. 
This new era of gangster cared little for the ethnicity of their partners, as long as the alliance was 
profitable. Luciano can thus be said to have created the American form of organized crime. In 
combination with Luciano, Lansky built an empire of organized crime using his superior intellect 
and business sense. He often bragged, "We're bigger than US Steel," (Sifakis 177). They 
created a organization ready to confront the business world. Then they set it in motion. 
The Rules 
It may at first be difficult to see the order which structured organized crime in all the 
chaos which was created. How could a massacre be related to economics? The motives become 
clear fairly quickly. What remains more nebulous is the goal which such violence served. What 
was the driving force of organized crime during prohibition? It was essentially the same force 
that had driven organized crime for decades - money. However, during prohibition, the available 
profits were significantly higher, driving a more violent and complex set of activities. How did 
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the increased opportunity to profit change the organization of crime? 
"I call myself a businessman. I make my money by supplying popular demand. If I break 
the law, my customers are as guilty as I am. When I sell liquor it's bootlegging. When my 
patrons serve it on silver trays on Lake Shore Drive, it's hospitality," (Asbury 291). Al Capone 
protested vehemently to being called anything other than a businessman. He truly believed that 
he supplied a demand and that this fact alone should be sufficient to legitimize him and his 
endeavors. That assumption seems, on the surface, to be somewhat doubtful. However, Capone 
is not alone in voicing the opinion that criminals may be classified, at least loosely, as 
businessmen. 
Frederic Homer, in Guns and Garlic, has said that "the organized criminal is just 
providing services citizens demand but by the quirk of law have been categorized as illicit," (53). 
Even without making a judgement as to the legitimacy of organized crime, it is clear that the 
activities do closely mirror those of business. Certainly the major goals of organized crime are 
economic. Organized criminals do not act out violent scenes in a fit of passion or rage. At all 
points they are attempting to either gain new profits or protect existing. Consequently, the 
actions and schemes which organized criminals pursue often parallel the strategies and 
organizations of legitimate corporations. These similarities must be examined individually to 
fully understand how closely they match those of the business world. 
Frederic Homer has identified seven econon1ic services which are provided by the 
criminal organization. Firstly, the organization provides protection of economic interests (Homer 
95). This was especially important during the period of Prohibition. With rival bootleggers 
kidnaping each other and hijacking the alcohol, retaliation and protection became an even more 
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integral part of organized crime. Serious losses of profits would have occurred had rivals been 
allowed to hijack alcohol without recourse. Secondly, the organization provides mediation of 
disputes between members (Homer 96). During Prohibition this, too, became increasingly 
important. With gangs carving up territory in order to profit, there were unavoidable disputes 
which had to be settled peaceably in order to prevent bloodshed and subsequent increased police 
attention. The dissolution of the Torrio pact and the resultant gang warfare merely illustrates this 
point. Thirdly, the organization is large enough to hold considerable sway over politicians and 
law enforcement (Homer 96). Bribes were another essential brick in the building of organized 
crime during the twenties. This was a significant cost for the organized criminal. The 
organization headed by Luciano and Lansky, for instance, was estimated to spend five million 
dollars a year in payoffs to police and politicians (Sifakis 47). Had each individual criminal 
been required to submit a separate bribe, it is doubtful that the same adherence would have been 
given. Fourth, the syndicate held economic opportunity in the form of franchise operations which 
allowed small members to create their own profits (Homer 96). By giving individuals the rights 
to a specific activity or territory, the organization acted much the same as a franchise corporation 
which allows independent operators to carry the corporation's name. This was also an essential 
division of labor within the organization which freed the boss from the most mundane of daily 
duties and allowed for a developing system of seniority which is very similar to a management 
structure. Fifth, the organization made available to these same people the capital and labor 
needed to run their criminal enterprises (Homer 96). Within the organization there were funds 
and workers available for those who would agree to be loyal to the gang. This further allowed 
small operations to flourish under the organization's leadership. Sixth, the organization provides 
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social services which may be required by the members (Homer 96). This would include 
provision of legal assistance or provisions for widows or wives and families left behind by jail 
sentences. It could also be extended to include the charitable giving undertaken by many 
gangsters during the Depression. Though the motives were self-serving, the results helped many. 
Lastly, the grouping of the organization minimizes the risks faced by anyone individual (Homer 
96). By pooling capital and providing blanket security from law enforcement the organization 
insured that it would continue to be profitable in the future. 
In addition to these economic benefits, which continue to be relevant, there are several 
econonlic structures which were more prevalent during the period of Prohibition. One of the 
changes which played a large role in increasing the efficiency of organized crime was vertical 
mergers. A vertical merger involves the melding of both upstream and downstream industries 
into a single corporation. In the case of bootlegging this would have involved a merger between 
a group of criminals solely involved in production or smuggling of liquor, a group involved in 
transport and packaging, and a group that was actually involved in speakeasies or other direct 
distribution. By combining their efforts under the name of a single organization these individual 
groups could gain several things. 
Firstly, they could be party to mediations of their differences provided by the 
organization. This would prevent bloodshed and interruptions by law enforcement. Mediation 
could also insure that the interests of the whole were placed above the interests of any singular 
group. If the interests of the smugglers, for instance, were counter to those of the whole, the 
bosses would weigh these interests. That is not to say, however, that the bosses had no favorites. 
Certainly old ties and influence played a role in the assignment of duties and the settling of 
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disputes. However, in the end the new generation of gangsters would almost always favor profit 
over loyalty. 
Secondly, the merger of vertical operations would insure a consistent demand for those 
upstream and a consistent supply for those downstream. The smugglers had little problem 
finding demand during the period of Prohibition. Those who operated downstream had 
considerable difficulty in finding alcohol that was of good quality. Consequently, downstream 
operators benefited more from these mergers. By operating only within the organization they 
gained the assurance of not only quantity but price. Those who operated in the middle ­
transporters, those who diluted alcohol, and the packagers - were also safeguarded in terms of 
price. Had they been forced to purchase their alcohol straight from the black market and then 
resell it to distributors they could easily have been caught in a price squeeze. With the high 
demand for both smuggled and bootlegged alcohol, the prices rose steadily and the mark up was 
high. Consumer demand was also high and one would expect prices received at speakeasies and 
saloons to remain sufficient to bring middle profits. However, if the differential in the price 
received by smugglers and bootleggers and the price paid by saloon and speakeasy owners 
decreased at all, the middle men would lose profits. By combining under a single organization, 
all involved were assured their monies. 
Another economic innovation which aided the development of organized crime during 
Prohibition was specialization. As implied by patterns of vertical merger, there were specific 
groups within crime which were involved in specific activities. This phenomenon actually 
predated the passage of the Volstead Act. Long before alcohol was illegal, there were gangs that 
had made their names in very specific areas. Torrio and Colosimo were known for prostitution, 
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Paul Kelly was known for labor racketeering, and the Q'Banion gang were known for their skills 
as robbers. There is some indication that ethnic traditions could be a determinant in the role a 
particular gang played. It is hypothesized, for instance, that Italians and Irish were especially 
involved in alcohol manufacture because they already, as a group, possessed the know-how for 
this activity (Homer 72). However, there were certainly people from all ethnic backgrounds and 
heritages involved in organized crime. Those who did not have previous knowledge learned as 
they went. 
Specialization also resulted from the amount of capital to which an organization had 
access. It obviously took more money to smuggle alcohol across the United States' borders than 
it did to provide home stills to produce alcohol. The previous influence of the gang was also be 
an explanation for specialization. The Unione Siciliana was able to extort alcohol production in 
Italian neighborhoods simply because they had an already established reputation within the area. 
Whatever their reasons for specializing, organized criminals gained much from the 
endeavor. Minimizing their exposure to law enforcement by only being involved in one phase of 
the process created fewer opportunities for arrest by the few officers that remained committed to 
the law. Prolonged involvement in a single aspect of production also produced gangs which 
were experts in their fields. Those who smuggled knew what was necessary to protect their 
investment as did those who produced alcohol in the tenen1ents. They were able to find the n10st 
efficient ways to fulfill their roles. Specialization also freed them to expand their endeavors. 
Because they were only involved in smuggling or bootlegging and did not have to worry about 
packaging or selling, the gangs had more time and capital to devote to their main activity. 
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The final, and most notable similarity between the business world of the twenties and the 
structure of the crime of the period is the tendency toward monopoly exhibited in both. During 
the early part of the twentieth century, American business was marked by several large 
corporations which dominated their respective industries. Standard Oil, US Steel, and American 
Tobacco are perhaps the most famous of the trusts. The trend toward concentration continued 
into the twenties through use by businesses ofmergers, predatory practices, and other schemes to 
eliminate their competition. 
Organized crime followed this same trend. Obviously, it was not constrained by the 
limits of law. Despite the lack of enforcement, there was antitrust law in existence in the period 
of Prohibition. Organized crime did not have to worry about such illegalities, however, because 
few would have thought to prosecute them, or even analyze them, in such a manner. Perhaps the 
most apparent manner by which criminals eliminated their competition was violence. It was this 
pattern which led Lucky Luciano to kill the Mustache Petes rather than set up his own 
organization separate from them. As criminals killed off their competition they also benefitted 
from the reputation for violence which they gained. The intimidation which accompanied such 
acts was essential for the bullying of other competitors. Had criminals been forced to resort to 
violence to end all competition they could never have hoped for law enforcement to remain 
neutral. 
Despite the heavy reliance on violence used by crime organizations, more conventional 
forms of monopolization were also present. Most clearly used by the organizations were 
exclusionary practices. Banned by the Clayton Act of 1914, exclusionary practices are artificial 
barriers which prevent entry into an industry or area by other firms. In the case of bootlegging 
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such practices would act to prevent small operators from starting operations or at least from 
gaining a major foothold within the area. There are two such practices which are especially 
applicable to the organized crime of the twenties. The first are geographical or territorial 
boundaries which act to constrain a firm's market. Such arrangements are obvious throughout 
organized crime. The Torrio pact was essentially such an agreement. Each gang was given a 
specific region in which to operate. No other gangs were allowed to infringe upon their 
competitors'territory. In addition, gangs were given only particular rights within those 
territories. One gang was assigned liquor rights, another would be given the right to run 
prostitution. Another example of geographical constraints within organized crime was the 
agreement reached by all interests in New York near the close of Prohibition. This nationwide 
territorial division was intended to maintain peace within gangland, always a concern. 
Another instance of exclusionary practices used by criminals during Prohibition was the 
constraint of exclusive dealings. Exclusive dealings involve the seller or distributor refusing to 
sell to a firm which handles other brands as well. In organized crime, this would be manifested 
as an agreement between a saloon or speakeasy operator and a bootlegger or smuggler in which 
the bootlegger refused to supply alcohol unless the saloon operator handled no other bootlegger's 
alcohol. This function was largely negated vertical mergers, which melded the organization into 
a continuous line ofproduction. However, organized criminals also gained sole access to snlall 
independent operators through this method as well. The reputation for violence as an 
enforcement measure was also essential in this instance because other criminals had no legal 
right to be in business and, therefore, no recourse. 
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Also applicable to the structure of the alcohol market during Prohibition is the dominant 
firm model (see Graph 1). In this model there exists one large firm with sufficient market power 
to set its own price. There also exist, however, several smaller firms. These firms, by nature of 
their size and market power are forced to be price takers, that is, subject to the price of the 
nlarket. As time progresses, the dominant firm sets their price. As this becomes the market 
price, smaller firms are forced to take it and then set their output at a level where that price is 
equal to their marginal cost. Each one of the small firms sells their chosen output. However, the 
large firm is free to supply the remaining demand. Small firms are limited not only by price, but 
by the output which they can produce as well. 
There was a dominant organization in virtually every city or section of a city in the United 
States. Because the major organization had the size, market power, and reputation to maintain 
their status, they were free to set their own prices. Consequently, any independent operators who 
were allowed to continue without violence were still subject to competition with the much larger 
organization. 
While each of these practices alone would probably be sufficient to define the illicit 
alcohol market of the twenties as monopolistic, still other factors existed which undoubtedly 
contributed to the ability of the organized criminals to pursue such activities. Entry barriers to 
the illicit alcohol market were high. This is a major determinant as to whether an industry is 
monopolized. Essentially, entry barriers are anything which makes it difficult for a new firm to 
begin operation within an industry. In this case, such barriers were numerous. Anyone wishing 
to enter the alcohol business in the major cities had the option of allying himself with the 
organization or attempting to operate independently. Togo in alone would necessitate several 
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things. It would mean breaking the law without the protection and legal assistance provided by 
the organization. Independence would also require an investment which, while not necessarily 
large, would be unprotected from loss by the pooling of assets. The independent bootlegger 
would also face enormous intimidation by the criminals within the organization who were his 
competitors. Joining with the gang would also not be easy. Organized crime in America has a 
history of distrust. One would first have to prove himself able and willing to use violence and to 
be loyal to the organization at all costs. 
Collusion was also a prevalent tool used by bootleggers in order to protect their business 
interests. Collusion involves an agreement, tacit or overt, to maintain prices at a given level. 
Through collusion, competitors neutralize the consumer's choice by agreeing to charge the same 
price for a good. Because of the high level of cooperation within organized crime it was fairly 
simple for collusion to take place. Many of the operators acted as franchises of the larger 
organization and were, therefore, indebted to the gang. Any attempt to not follow given prices 
would bring immediate retribution. However, it was also fairly easy for criminals to cheat within 
their cartel. Such instances usually involve one competitor lowering his price in order to gain a 
larger number of products sold. As in most collusion systems, this was fairly common. Such a 
price cutting scheme contributed to the Chicago gang wars when the Gennas began to move 
cheap liquor into the territory of Dion O'Banion. 
Several negative outcomes are associated with the monopolistic market that prevailed. 
Firstly, rather than setting their price at the intersection of their marginal cost (the cost to produce 
one additional unit of a good) and the demand for that good, as competitive markets do, 
monopolists set their price where their marginal cost intersects marginal revenue (the additional 
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revenue gained by producing one additional unit). (See Graphs 2 and 3) This results in a loss of 
consumer surplus. Consumer surplus, defined as the difference in what one is willing to pay and 
one actually must pay, is used to determine whether a market is allocatively efficient (See Graphs 
4 and 5). Because there is deadweight loss in the monopolistic market there is no allocative 
efficiency. In addition to being allocatively efficient, the perfectly competitive market will also 
be productively efficient, that is, firms will produce a quantity of goods consistent with the 
minimum of their long run average cost (See Graph 6). Monopolistic markets do not follow this 
pattern, usually producing less of the good. Thus, the monopolistic market is neither allocatively 
or productively efficient. 
While economic models can define and describe these phenomena and discern that they 
are present within the perfectly competitive market, they have some difficulty in establishing 
whether or not their absence is necessarily negative. The lack of consumer surplus within the 
illicit liquor market meant that consumers were restricted by price from buying as much alcohol 
as they would have wished. Given the illegal status of alcohol, however, it would seem that the 
lack of consumer surplus was positive. Certainly higher prices helped to curb the consumption 
of alcohol somewhat. This was assistance that law enforcement badly needed. To the consumer 
who saw prohibition as a farce, however, higher prices certainly were a burden. The question of 
whether consumer surplus was negative in this case thus becomes a question of perspective. 
In addition, there could have been a shift in the demand curve which would have negated 
any effects on consumer surplus caused by price. It is generally thought that the actual number of 
people who considered drinking acceptable and drank increased during the period of prohibition. 
If this is true, the demand for alcohol rose, modeled by an outward shift in the demand curve. 
56 

Thus, a higher price coupled with higher demand would not necessarily decrease the consumer 
surplus. In fact, if the shift in demand was greater than the increase in price, consumer surplus 
could actually have risen. It is extremely difficult to measure accurately changes in demand, 
however. Nevertheless, assuming all other things remained constant, the increase in price meant 
a loss in consumer surplus. 
In practice, these theoretical predictions were often born out in the business of illicit 
liquor. Because there were so few organizations with such concentrated control of the market for 
alcohol, they were able to set their price, rather than being forced to accept the competitive price 
equal to their marginal cost. Thus, organized criminals were free to maximize their profits by 
setting their price far higher than the competitive standard. Consumer surplus is much harder to 
ascertain. While is it certain that the prices for alcohol were high, it is difficult to know what the 
demand for that alcohol actually was. To simply say it was high is not enough. What is really 
needed is the differential between the price people would have paid and what they actually did 
pay. Despite the difficulties in quantifying this, one may safely say that prices were sufficiently 
high to cause some loss in allocative efficiency. 
It is apparent that the criminal organization can indeed be analyzed as a business venture. 
The motives of such illegal endeavors are clearly profits. In addition, it is fairly clear that the 
pattern which the organizations tend to follow is one of monopolization. Several of the methods 
which are utilized are, at least in theory, no different than those used by legitimate corporations. 
Thus, it would seem that the organization's destructive characteristics are the pursuit of illegal 
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The Results 
Obviously, organized crime was a significant problem during prohibition. The 
entrepreneurial tendencies of the criminals led them to pursue money with a new vengeance. 
This led to more violence and an increased emphasis on cooperation and organization. However, 
organized crime was not the only blot on the record ofprohibition. From the onset, problems 
plagued the noble experiment, dooming it eventually to be reversed. What was it that caused 
prohibition to fail? 
On Decerrlber fifth, 1933, the Twenty-first Amendment was adopted as part of the United 
States Constitution and prohibition came to an end. Undoubtedly, this period in American 
history had significant impacts on the society as a whole. The large majority of the population 
would come to view prohibition as an utter failure, and a costly one, at that. There is little doubt 
that prohibition failed to meet its main objective of stopping consumption of alcoholic beverages. 
However, there is some debate as to why this was the case and still further debate on whether 
prohibition was responsible for the huge outbreak in crime experienced during the period. 
Why did prohibition fail? The answer is perhaps so simple as to require no explanation at 
all. Prohibition failed simply because the American public was unwilling to forego their alcohol 
consunlption. Yet, this truly seems too easy an answer. Certainly demand played a large role in 
the failure of prohibition. However, it seems fairly clear that the desire to drink extended during 
the period of prohibition to people who never before would have considered such actions. It is 
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likely that the forbidden fruit phenomenon played a significant role in this. People began to 
drink because they were not allowed to do so, and breaking such a rule gave them a new feeling 
of excitement. The surface flash of organized crime added to this sense. Gangsters in their 
expensive suits and bulletproof cars did little to inspire a law-abiding pUblic. 
Another significant factor in the failure ofprohibition would appear to be the 
underestimation of alcohol sources by its proponents. It seems fairly obvious that those who 
supported the cause of the drys seriously misjudged the ability of the people to fulfill their desires 
for alcohol. The exemptions provided by the Volstead Act for pharmaceutical, sacramental, and 
low percentage alcohol proved fertile ground for those wishing to break the law. There was also 
substantial knowledge about brewing and distilling among the population as a whole. These 
factors, combined with the ingenuity shown by those who smuggled alcohol across the borders 
created an enforcement problem which those who had proposed prohibition had failed to foresee. 
Perhaps the final reason for prohibition's failure was the poor funding provided for 
enforcement of the law. Wayne Wheeler initially believed that enforcement would require a 
yearly budget of only five million dollars, and although this had grown to twelve million by 
1927, the monies still proved woefully inadequate (Asbury 171). Low funding meant there were 
very few enforcement officers on the streets and that those that were had huge territories to cover. 
At the beginning of prohibition, 1500 officers were alotted to enforcement ofprohibition crimes 
(Asbury 141). National leaders seriously misjudged the number of offenses that would occur 
and consequently appropriated far from enough money and staff to handle the load. Even with 
the lax enforcement, the number of prohibition violations was substantial. By 1924 the number 
of persons incarcerated in federal prisons had doubled and U.S. Attorneys were spending over 
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forty-four percent of their time ofprohibition cases (Asbury 169-170). 
These problems had significant impact on the era of prohibition. Drinking during 
prohibition was quite high, with Americans consuming 200 million gallons of hard liquor, 684 
million gallons of malt liquor, and 118 million gallons of wine (Behr 158). The fatalities and 
injuries suffered by those who drank were also high. Due to the high demand and lack of 
regulation the quality of alcohol sold on the black market was often of poor quality. Sometimes 
it was even deadly. Industrial alcohols were sold without being denatured, resulting in toxic 
poisoning. The drys had lobbied against warnings on such alcohol and the results were tragic. 
Almost 600,000 gallons of denatured alcohol were sold a month by 1926, and a large portion of 
this may be assumed to have gone for personal consumption (Behr 163). Other methods of 
brewing also created toxic results. The death tolls prove that breaking prohibition could prove 
fatal. In January, 1927, forty-seven people died in New York from poison alcohol and in 1926 
there were 750 deaths (Behr 221). The public outcry from such deaths was a substantial factor in 
the repeal of the law. Even Americans who were willing to say alcohol should be banned were 
reluctant to see fellow citizens die unnecessarily. 
Americans were also unwilling to see lawlessness spread any further than it already had. 
Crime, not just that stemming from large criminal organizations, was on the rise during the 
twenties. This was a costly trend. Increased enforcenlent, jails, and court overloads proved 
expensive for the American economy. It was estimated at a loss of almost ten billion dollars a 
year by Louis Seibold of the Evening Post (Feldman 351). There were some disparities in this 
trend, however. For instance, there was a decrease in the number of commitments to jail for 
drunkenness (Feldman 354). This could be explained, however, by the amount of bribery or 
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other lax enforcement procedures which have been well-documented. Perhaps most surprising is 
that the number ofpeople injail for all offenses actually fell from 479,787 in 1910 to 357,493 in 
1923 (Feldman 357). Why, then, is there the general concensus that the twenties was a period of 
increased crime? 
The answer lies not in the number of crimes committed, but in the type of crimes 
con1mitted. Drunkenness is a relatively minor crime. Other crin1es such as burglary, trespassing, 
and fraud are generally regarded as non-violent. These are the crimes which were less prevalent 
during the twenties. What was more prevalent was homicide, robbery, and rape (Feldman 358). 
These crimes are much more violent in nature and tend to draw more attention. Also important 
to the attitudes about crimes during the twenties was the nature in which these crimes were 
committed. A brawl in which one participant is killed is somehow less disturbing to the national 
psyche than an execution style murder, such as the St. Valentine's Day massacre. The brutal and 
senseless nature of the crimes associated with the twenties overshadows the reality that crime on 
the whole decreased. 
Was prohibition responsible for this? Perhaps. Maybe the huge profits to be gained from 
illicit liquor were too strong an incentive for those involved in crime. The spirit of lawlessness 
which came fron1 breaking the prohibition provisions may have spread enough to allow such 
events to occur. In the end, it did not matter whether prohibition caused these problems. It was 
prohibition that was blamed. A country struggling in depression was no longer willing to see 
gangsters grow rich off the profits of illegal liquor. It was no longer willing to see blood on the 





Organized crime and economics are two subj ects with more in common than is apparent. 
Organized crime is motivated by the search for profits. These are also the basic goals of any 
corporation. The patterns of organized crime during prohibition closely mirror several well­
established models of economic behavior. 
Organized crime during the period used vertical mergers to gain market power and 
control of the illicit liquor industry. Secondly, organizations became increasingly specialized in 
order to gain a more efficient production process. The third and most prevalent economic 
behavior was the attempt by organizations to gain monopolies in the area of illicit liquor. These 
attempts followed several patterns which were paralleled in the larger economy of the period as 
the trend toward concentration took form. Through careful analysis of the causes, atmosphere, 
and events of organized crime during prohibition, it becomes obvious that the criminals of the 
period had much more in common with legitimate businessmen than anyone would cared to have 
admitted. 
Was the similarity particular to the period? Probably not. Criminals had shown their 
proclivity toward business organization long before prohibition went into effect. However, 
without prohibition the great incentive ofprofit would have been decreased and the changes and 
innovations which came to organized crime would probably have occurred more slowly. Nor did 
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this behavior end with the demise ofprohibition. Gangsters continue to playa strong role in 
many legitimate industries and operate the majority of their endeavors for the sole purpose of 
profit. Thus, prohibition, while not the cause of organized crime's activities, was certainly a 
catalyst for the new pattern of American crime. 
Neither can organized crime be blamed for the end of prohibition. Problems with the law 
existed at the most basic levels. Loopholes and lax enforcement did nothing to deter those who 
wished to break the already weak law. The government failed to accurately assess the violations 
which would occur and then failed to appropriate sufficient funds to handle those that did. With 
the coming of the Great Depression, Americans' patience grew increasingly short. No longer 
were they willing to see criminals benefit from the sale of alcohol, sales which would bring no 
tax revenue to the national coffers. 
What then is the significance of the experiment that was prohibition and the crime that 
marked its existence? Mostly, its legacy is legend. Darkened speakeasies, dapper gangsters, 
thrilling shoot-outs, and lawmen that won out in the end. These are the immediate associations 
the mind makes with prohibition. Those who participated have become legends in their own 
right. Lucky Luciano, Al Capone, Johnny Torrio, and Meyer Lansky are names that will not soon 
be forgotten. The American fascination with the mafia can trace its roots to these men and their 
counterparts. 
American society was shaped by prohibition. The individualism that most people prided 
themselves on proved ill-suited to such legislation. The public reacted by changing its drinking 
patterns. No longer was it taboo for women or schoolboys to drink. In fact, it became an 
admirable activity, at least in some circles. Perhaps the memory of prohibition has faded 
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somewhat, but maybe it lingers more than Anlerica would care to admit. 
Underneath the movie plots and legend, however, there are serious lessons which can be 
learned. Profit motivates crime. Laws which create ready-made industries in which criminals 
can find their fortune should be assumed to produce violations. Enforcement must be supported 
wholeheartedly if the efforts are to succeed. Humanitarian notions cannot be assumed to be 
sufficient to produce lawfulness. Laws must be openly and honestly debated and critiqued in 
order to assure the needed provisions. 
Could prohibition happen again? Probably not in exactly the same manner as it did 
during the twenties. However, there are situations which could create similar outcomes. 
Banning cigarettes is one example. The American public has proven ambivalent on this issue at 
best. Certainly black market cigarettes could prove immensely profitable for those willing to 
take the risks. Proponents of drug legalization also point to this argument. Drugs certainly create 
huge profits for those who sell them. Society must weigh the crimes this motivation creates with 
the value of making drugs illegal. 
The lessons of prohibition remain valuable to the present day. It is unlikely that an exact 
replica of the era will occur sometime in the future. However, similar situations may present 
themselves at any time. If the lessons are forgotten, they will simply have to be relearned. Much 
better to overestimate the minds of criminals than to underestimate them and reap the 
consequences. Perhaps one FBI agent said it best when he spoke of Meyer Lansky. "He would 
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